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interest in resolving disputes in which an Ohio company
is a party because the suits involve Ohio law trade
names and trademarks claims. More than $10 million
may be at stake, and the result of the case would have an
impact on CompuServe's relationships with other
shareware providers. The court found the relationship
between Patterson and Ohio substantial enough and,
therefore, reasonable for an Ohio court to assert personal
jurisdiction over Patterson.
The court limited its holding to the circumstances in
this case. Further, the court, noting the emergence of
communications and business on the Internet, explained
the potential of additional lawsuits, and other related

issues, on the horizon, which will need to be resolved in
the future. The court stressed that it did not hold that
Patterson would be subject to lawsuits in states where
his software was purchased or used or where his
software might have caused a "computer virus." In
addition, the court's holding did not extend to a situation
where CompuServe would attempt to sue any subscriber
for nonpayment of its services in Ohio. In reversing the
district court's dismissal, the court of appeals held that
people like Patterson who employ a computer network
service to market a product can reasonably expect to
resolve lawsuits in the state where the service's headquarters is located.-

World Wide Web site does not create personal
jurisdiction
by Allison E. Cahill

In Bensusan RestaurantCorp. v.
King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed a claim of
trademark infringement for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The court
held that the creation of a World
Wide Web site is not an offer to sell
in New York. Thus, New York's
long arm statute does not apply. The
court further held that "even if
personal jurisdiction was proper
under the long arm statute, the
assertion of personal jurisdiction
would violate due process."
Bensusan, a New York Corporation which owns "The Blue Note"
jazz club in New York City, brought
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suit alleging that Richard B. King
("King") infringed on the Blue Note
trademark by posting a site on the
World Wide Web to promote a
Missouri jazz club which he owned.
King moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
In April 1996, King posted a
general access site on the Internet.
The site contained a disclaimer, a
calendar of events, and names and
addresses of ticket outlets in
Columbia, Missouri. The disclaimer
stated that "[tihe Blue Note's
Cyberspot should not be confused
with one of the world's finest jazz
club[s] [the] Blue Note, located in
the heart of New York's Greenwich
Village." This site also contained a
hyperlink, which allows Internet

users to connect to Bensusan's Blue
Note site.

Providing information
about the product is not a

sale
Bensusan argued that the tortious
act provisions of New York's long
arm statute established personal
jurisdiction over King. N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 302 (a)(2), (a)(3)(ii). Section
302(a)(2) of New York's long arm
statute ("Section 302 (a)(2)")
provides that personal jurisdiction
may be found if one not domiciled
in New York "commits a tortious act
within the state" and the plaintiff's
cause of action arises from this act.
The Second Circuit, in Vanity Fair
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Mills, Inc., set forth the standard for
determining whether trademark
infringement has occurred. See
Vanity FairMills, Inc. v. T Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1956). Under Vanity FairMills, Inc.,
an offer to sell "even one copy of an
infringing product in New York" is
sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. This is true even if no
sale actually occurs. Accordingly,
the issue in this case was whether
the creation of a Web site constituted
an offer to sell a product in New
York.
The court held that King's Web
site, containing a telephone number
to order tickets to a club in Missouri,
does not constitute an offer to sell
the alleged infringing product in
New York. Thus, under Section 302
(a)(2), the court could not properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over
King.
The court pointed out that almost
anyone with Internet access could
gain access to King's Web site.
However, the court stated that
obtaining information concerning
the product is different from "a
person advertising, promoting,
selling or otherwise making an effort
to target its product in New York."
The court noted that nothing
suggests King shipped the product
into New York or that King directed
any other infringing activity to New
York.

King. Bensusan argued that under
this provision, a court may "exercise
personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary for tortious acts committed outside the state that cause injury
in the state if the non-domiciliary
'expects or should reasonably expect
the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue
from interstate or international
commerce."' The court rejected this
argument because King did not
receive substantial revenue from his
Web site. Mere participation in
interstate commerce is not enough to
grant personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the defendant
gained no "substantial revenue from
interstate commerce." The court
noted that 99% of King's revenue
was derived from local residents in
Columbia, Missouri.
Furthermore, the court stated that
King's knowledge that the Bensusan
club was located in New York did
not to establish foreseeability; in
order to meet the foreseeability
requirement, the defendant must
make a "discernible effort" to serve
a market in New York. Finally, the
court ruled that Bensusan did not
show any "significant economic
injury." Thus, the court held that
Section 302 (a)(3) did not authorize
personal jurisdiction over King.

Personal jurisdiction over
King in New York would

violate due process
New York has no personal
jurisdiction over King
Bensusan further contended that
Section 302 (a)(3)(ii) of New York's
long arm statute ("Section 302
(a)(3)") permitted the court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over
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The court further held that even if
personal jurisdiction was proper
under New York's long arm statute,
granting personal jurisdiction in this
case would violate the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

Due process requires minimum
contact with the forum state such
that "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" are not
offended. See InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). The minimum contact
standard requires the examination of
three factors:
(1) whether the defendant purposefully
availed himself of the
benefits of the forum
state; (2) whether the
defendant's conduct and
connection with the
forum state are such that
he should reasonably
anticipate being haled
into court there; and (3)
whether the defendant
carries on a continuous
and systematic part of its
general business within
the forum state. Id.
The court held that King did not
"purposefully avail himself of the
benefits" of New York. He merely
created a Web site which allowed
anyone to access it. The court stated
that creating a Web site is analogous
to placing a product in the stream of
commerce and is not purposefully
directed at the forum state. The court
further noted that King conducted no
business in New York. Finally, the
court stated that Bensusan's allegation that King "should have foreseen
that users could access the site in
New York and be confused as to the
relationship of the two Blue Note
clubs is insufficient to satisfy due
process." Thus, the court held that
King did not conduct "continuous or
systematic" business within the
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forum state.
In conclusion, the court granted
King's motion to dismiss the
trademark infringement case for lack
of personal jurisdiction. The court
held that King did not direct any

infringing activity toward New
York. In addition, King did not
make "a discernible effort" to
market his club in New York.
Finally, the court held that even if
personal jurisdiction was proper

____

_

under New York's long arm statute,
it would violate the Due Process
Clause because King did not
purposefully establish minimum
contacts with New York..

NBA games not "original works of authorship"no protection under federal Copyright Act
by Thomas O'Connor

In NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2nd Cir.
1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the transmission of scores and
other information by way of a hand-held pager during
National Basketball Association ("NBA") games does
not constitute a misappropriation of "hot news," because
athletic events are not original works of authorship and,
thus, are not copyrightable.

Motorola developed "real time" NBA

score pager
Motorola developed a hand-held pager which
displays scores and other information from NBA games
while the games are being played. Motorola receives the
information from Sports Team Analysis and Tracking
Systems ("STATS"), a company that monitors NBA
games and gathers information. STATS employs
reporters who watch the games on television or listen to
them on the radio and subsequently enter the scores into
personal computers. The information is relayed to a host
computer which compiles and analyzes the data and
sends it to a common carrier. The common carrier then
sends the information, via satellite, to local FM radio
networks which, in turn, emit a signal received by the
Motorola pager. A lag of two to three minutes exists
between the actual game and the display of information
on the pager. The NBA maintained that the games and
television broadcasts were "original works of authorship" and, therefore, were protected by the federal
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Copyright Act ("the Act") and state misappropriation
law.

Scores reproduced from copyrighted
broadcast not infringement
In 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act to
provide copyright protection to broadcasts of live
events, including sports. However, the issue in this case
was not a rebroadcast of the game, but a reporting of
scores and statistics from the broadcast. The scores and
statistics are facts which any person attending an NBA
may obtain. Facts are not copyrightable. Only expressions of originality may be copyrightable. Accordingly,
the court held that STATS did not infringe on the
copyrighted broadcasts.

Court differentiates between athletic
events and the broadcasts of those events
While broadcasts of live basketball games involve
skill and production, such that an unauthorized reproduction of the game would violate copyright laws, actual
games and the correlative information and scores are not
copyrightable. The court held that basketball games do
not constitute "original works of authorship" under 17
U.S.C. § 102(a), as athletic events are not among or
analogous to any of the eight categories of protected
"works" in the Act. The court noted that any "scripting"
of the events in a game is suggestive and general, and
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